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At present there are 1425 tariff rate quotas (TRQs) notified by member countries to the 
World Trade Organization. TRQs were provided for in the Uruguay Round as a trade 
policy instrument to guarantee minimum market access for politically sensitive 
agricultural imports, and in some cases to continue managed trade regimes. This article 
evaluates the developmental relevance of TRQs and discusses how the various 
methods TRQ administration methods influence market access in Switzerland for 
agricultural products from developing countries. The findings show that existing TRQ 
management in Switzerland is complicated and lacks transparency. Further, the manner 
in which TRQs are administered results in high transaction costs, a situation that fails 
to liberate trade opportunities from rents and influences trade flows of the partner 
countries. Proposed reforms are establishment of a more efficient administrative 
mechanism, modalities to liberalize trade with TRQs through reduction of out-of-quota 
tariffs, and capacity building in developing countries; such reforms would maximize 
market access opportunities from a development perspective. 
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Introduction 
rticle 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) mandates member countries of 
the World Trade Organization to negotiate and continue reform in agriculture. 
Even though farm policy reforms in developed countries have been along the lines of 
Uruguay Round rules, there has been widespread skepticism about the effectiveness of 
these reforms (Josling & Hathaway, 2004). Among other measures, tariff rate quotas
1 
(TRQs) were implemented as a policy instrument in the Uruguay Round, primarily to 
ensure “minimum” market access for sensitive agricultural products and to safeguard 
current access levels in the face of high tariffs (Mathews & Dupraz, 2002; Abbott, 
2002). At present there are 1425 TRQs notified by member countries of the WTO 
(WTO, 2004a). Studies, however, indicate that the results of TRQ implementation are 
not what this number would lead us to expect, and nearly 28-30 percent of the 
domestic production in developed countries is protected by TRQs (OECD, 2003). This 
is a matter of concern for developing countries that are potentially large exporters of 
agricultural products; TRQs are, therefore, widely debated from a development 
perspective (Abbott & Paarlberg, 1998; Skully 1999, 2001; Boughner & de Gorter 
1999; Abbott & Morse, 1999; Hermann, Mönnich & Kramb, 2000; Abbott, 2002; 
Mathews & Dupraz, 2002; Beghin & Aksoy, 2002; de Gorter & Hranaiova, 2003). 
There are three main reasons to question the feasibility of employing TRQs as a 
market access instrument. First, studies show that the choice of administrative method 
influences the extent of market access afforded to trading partners (Skully, 2001; 
Abbott, 2002; Panagariya, 2002; de Gorter & Hranaiova, 2003). Second, there has 
been a persistent low fill of TRQs at the multilateral level (WTO, 2002). Finally, 
quota rents are often associated with TRQ regimes; these generate costs for both the 
preferred and excluded countries and in turn distort trade flows of the partner 
countries (Binswanger & Lutz, 1999; Skully, 2001; Vanzetti et al., 2004).
2 
The notified and enforced TRQs are concentrated in a few countries – Norway 
ranks first (232), followed by Poland (109), Iceland (90), the EU (87), Bulgaria (73) 
and Hungary (70). The geographical distribution of TRQs indicates that more than 79 
percent of the total emanate from countries in Europe (773), North America (86) and 
South America (268). For the remaining 244, the usage is by countries in Asia (157), 
Africa (82) and Oceania (5).
3 Of the total TRQs, 217 are country-specific, with 
Europe and North America accounting for 187 of these (WTO, 2000; WTO, 2002). 
The product distribution of notified TRQs shows that nearly 75 percent of all TRQs 
are accounted for by four product categories. The main product groups with the largest 
number of TRQs are fruit and vegetables (370), followed by meat products 
(258),  cereals (226) and dairy products (183). Tobacco (13) ranks last among the 
twelve product categories notified by the member countries of the WTO. The main 
methods employed to administer TRQs are applied tariffs; first-come first-served 
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(FCFS); historical importers (HI); licences on demand (LD); state trading and 
producer groups (ST/PG); bilateral agreements; country-specific quotas; auctioning 
(AU) and mixed methods (WTO, 2000; WTO, 2002). Countries also use additional 
conditions to allocate import licences, e.g., limits on import quota shares, export 
certificates and domestic purchase requirements.  
This article evaluates the impact of TRQs from a developmental perspective and 
analyzes how the different administration methods influence market access for 
agricultural products from developing countries. Using the example of Switzerland, 
the article first analyzes whether developing countries’ agricultural exports gain access 
into the Swiss market within lower in-quota tariffs. Second, the article identifies the 
inefficiencies and main impediments to market access for developing countries’ 
exporters. Finally, modalities are recommended for liberalizing trade under TRQs. 
The structure of the article is as follows: section 2 traces the history of negotiations on 
TRQs and discusses their importance as trade policy in the multilateral trading system. 
Section 3 presents an overview of TRQ management in Switzerland. Section 4 
analyzes how the administrative mechanism, together with tariffs and non-tariff 
measures, influences trade flows and market access for agricultural products. Section 
5 concludes with recommendations to strengthen the existing TRQ framework and 
proposes an eventual phase-out of TRQs in the long term. 
History of Negotiations on TRQs 
he initial objective of TRQs was to provide preferential treatment for developing 
countries by allowing them to export at lower tariffs, subject to quantity 
constraints (Rom, 1979). In the Uruguay Round, 37 countries participated in the 
tariffication process. TRQs were negotiated as a compromise instrument, to include 
both tariffication and minimum access commitments, in the face of resistance to 
convert all non-tariff barriers into (lower) tariffs for politically sensitive goods 
(Abbott, 2002). As part of the tariffication process, member countries agreed to 
maintain “current” import access opportunities for tariffied products at levels 
corresponding to those existing during the base period, i.e., 1986-1988, at terms no 
less favourable than in the base year period (WTO, 1993). Where such current access 
had been less than 5 percent of domestic consumption of the product in question, the 
agreement required an (additional) “minimum” access opportunity on a most-favoured 
nation (MFN) basis at a low tariff rate (Ingco & Hathaway, 1996). This was to ensure 
that in 1995 the combined current and minimum access opportunities represented at 
least 3 percent of base-period consumption, which would progressively expand to 
reach 5 percent of that consumption in 2000 for developed countries and in 2004 for 
least developed countries (LDCs) (WTO, 1993; WTO, 1995; Tangermann, 2001). 
However, the conversion of quantitative restrictions to tariffs and tariff equivalents 
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gave the countries flexibility for “dirty tariffication”
4 (Ingco, 1996; Nogues, 2002) and 
“dirty quotification”
5 (Bureau & Tangermann, 2000). As a result, only some TRQs 
increased market access compared with earlier levels; most TRQs merely preserved 
pre-agreement levels of protection (OECD, 1999).  
In legal terms, TRQs do not constitute quantitative restrictions, because they do 
not limit import quantities but rather allow excess imports at the higher out-of-quota 
tariffs. The rationale for implementation of TRQs in this form is that tariffs are 
predictable and transparent to exporters; as well, they provide importers the 
opportunity to import at out-of-quota tariff rates, an opportunity that is not available 
under a regular quota (Wainio, 2001). However, if the out-of-quota tariff is very high 
it makes imports prohibitively expensive and yields the same import volume as a 
traditional quota. If the difference between domestic and international prices exceeds 
the out-of-quota tariff, a TRQ can result in a different volume of trade than a standard 
quota. In such a case, importers profit from high rents despite paying out-of-quota 
tariffs on imports.  
Article XIII sets forth two normative criteria to administer TRQs and the resulting 
distribution of trade. Article XIII (2) of the GATT states “in applying import 
restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at a distribution of trade in 
such product approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various 
contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions ….” 
The text asserts that trade shares should be determined by the relative efficiency of 
suppliers and not by alternative discriminatory criteria. The Agreement on Import 
Licensing, which oversees the allocation of licences under the TRQ regime,
6 requires 
that rules applied by importing countries for licensing procedures should “… be 
neutral in application and administered in a fair and equitable manner.” It states that 
licensing procedures should not be trade distorting or restrictive and “… no more 
administratively burdensome than absolutely necessary to administer the measure.” 
The importing country, therefore, gets to decide which method is “fair and equitable” 
and “least administratively burdensome”. The determination of TRQ allocation is a 
tricky issue that has not been addressed in the AoA, which allows the administering 
country to choose among the different methods to manage its imports. Often, 
countries combine different administrative methods,
7 which increases the complexity 
of this trade policy instrument and the consequent market access allowed to exporting 
countries. WTO member countries have, however, stressed the need to improve the 
existing TRQ administration rules as a means to enhance market access for 
developing countries’ products (WTO, 2004a).
8  
Fill rates of TRQs are another important issue in the ongoing agricultural market 
access negotiations. During the period 1995-2000, the simple average fill rates for all 
TRQ administration methods ranged between 60 and 66 percent; the state S. Khorana 
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trading/producer groups method had the highest fill rates, followed by FCFS and HI 
(WTO, 2002). An interesting feature is that despite the increasing use of auctions, this 
method had the lowest fill rate. This suggests that the fill rate of a TRQ may not 
always be an indicator of its efficiency and that an underfill can be attributed to the 
existing market conditions. The perception that fill rates are a measure of the 
efficiency of TRQs is, therefore, unfounded. 
TRQ Management and Patterns of Trade in Switzerland 
witzerland is a net importer of agricultural products and ranks eleventh as an 
importer of agricultural and food products in the world.
9 In 2006, the total value 
of agricultural imports was over 10,358 million CHF (Swiss Aussenhandelsstatistik, 
2006
10). Agricultural products are imported under 28 TRQs notified on 282 tariff lines 
(at the eight-digit level of tariff classification under the harmonized system
11). 
Switzerland has notified TRQs on live animals (HS 1); meat and edible meat offal (HS 
2 and HS 16); milk and dairy products, eggs (HS 4); bovine semen (HS 5); live plants 
and cut flowers (HS 6); fresh vegetables (HS 7); fresh fruits (HS 8); grains (HS 10); 
seed fruit products (HS 20); spirits, beverages and vinegar (HS 22); and casein (HS 
35).
12 These notified TRQs are concentrated in a few product categories, with more 
than one TRQ within a product group. Fruits and vegetables (9) exhibit maximum 
concentration of TRQ usage, followed by meat and meat products (6) and dairy and 
dairy products (5). Most TRQs are notified under the current access commitments; 
exceptions are potatoes (HS 7) and pork (HS 2), which are notified under the 
minimum access commitment (WTO, 2004c).  
Switzerland has very high out-of-quota tariff rates; table 1 shows the average, 
maximum and minimum ad varolem equivalents
13 (AVEs) for product groups 
imported under TRQs. The highest average AVEs are notified on live animals (488 
percent), followed by dairy (141 percent), cereals (123 percent) and meat (104 
percent). High AVEs on most products imply that the Swiss authorities use high out-
of-quota tariffs to bind imports at the level of the TRQ. First, high out-of-quota tariffs 
protect domestic production of sensitive commodities like live animals, meat and 
edible meat offal, dairy and dairy products, vegetables and products of the milling 
industry. Second, high out-of-quota tariffs are employed as a means to achieve the 
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Table 1  AVEs for Products Imported under TRQs, 2006 
ct 
codes 






   in percentage terms 
HS 1   live animals  10554.11 487.53  0.00 
HS 2   meat and edible meat offal  1212.19 104.43  0.50 
HS 4   dairy, dairy produce, birds’ eggs  1005.80 140.59  0.00 
HS 5   bovine semen  1060.79 34.35 0.00 
HS 6   live trees and cut flowers   577.97 25.55 0.00 
HS 7   edible fresh vegetables   793.31 56.49 0.00 
HS 8   edible fresh fruits  202.38 11.63 0.00 
HS 10   cereals  453.11 122.86  0.00 
HS 11   products of the milling industry; malt; starches  991.26 91.31 0.00 
HS 16   preparations of meat/fish/molluscs/crustaceans/
other aquatic invertebrates  157.28 22.50 0.00 
HS 20   seed fruit products  1689.24 28.77 0.00 
HS 22   beverages, spirits and vinegar  342.36 25.97 0.00 
Source: Macmaps_HS2, using ad valorem equivalents 
 
The management of TRQs is governed by the Federal Law on Agriculture of 29 
April 1998, which entered into force on 1 January 1999 (Systematic Compendium – 
RS 910.1), the Federal Law on Alcohol of 21 June 1932 (RS 680) and the General 
Ordinance on Imports of Agricultural Products of 7 December 1998 (RS 916.01). The 
Federal Office of Agriculture (FOA) is the competent authority for administering and 
allocating import quotas/licences to importers during the administered period, which 
generally lasts from May until October every year. The main methods employed to 
administer TRQs are historical imports (HI); first-come first-served (FCFS); auctions; 
licences on demand (pro rata); domestic purchase requirement (prise en charge); 
market share of importers; and products imported for reprocessing into exports. The 
HI method is the one most frequently used to manage imports of beef and pork meat 
(HS 2) and vegetables (HS 7) during the administered period. The licences-on-
demand (LD) method is the second most used method. LD allocates import quotas 
based on the quantities for imports requested/number of requests by the importers; if 
the sum of quota allocations exceeds the minimum quota commitments, the 
allocations are reduced proportionally by the administering authority to adjust all the 
requests. The LD method is generally employed to manage vegetable imports (HS 7). 
Domestic purchase requirement (DPR) requires importers to commit to domestic 
purchases; they are then allowed to import a prescribed proportion or ratio of their 
domestic purchases. This method is frequently used in combination with other S. Khorana 
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methods (e.g., HI) to manage imports of meat (HS 2) and cut flowers (HS 6). The 
FCFS method allocates licences to import horses for breeding (HS 1) and wine (HS 
22) in the order of receipt of applications until the notified quota is full. The existing 
TRQ regime also allows imports for reprocessing into exports; dairy products (HS 4) 
and casein (HS 35) are important examples managed with this method.  
Increasingly, Switzerland employs auctions to manage its TRQs; at present import 
allocations for meat (HS 2, 16) and cut flowers (HS 6) are auctioned.
14 A competitive 
sealed bid auction format is utilized to allocate TRQs, starting from the highest to 
lowest bid until the entire import quota is allocated.
15 Meat auctions are managed with 
the variable supply model,
16 which allows the TRQ administering authority to change 
the quantities to be auctioned based on the bidding pattern. If the bidding pattern is 
weak, the total import quantity for auction can be reduced; however, if the bids 
suggest evidence of high demand, the import quota for auction can be increased. This 
method therefore allows the administering authority to set the reserve price based on 
bids submitted by the bidders in the auction.  
In addition, combinations of different administration methods are employed to 
manage imports, making the existing administrative mechanism highly complicated 
and non-transparent. The complexity of TRQ management is exacerbated by 
additional requirements for specific product groups. For example, in order to be 
eligible to import grapes for pressing and grape juice (HS 20), white wine in bottles, 
red wine other than industrial wine, and white wine in bulk other than industrial wine 
(HS 22), importers need to have a valid import licence and also register with Eidg. 
Weinhandelskommission,  Zürich. Similarly, for importers of durum wheat, bread 
grains other than cereals and cereal products suitable for use for human consumption 
(HS 10), the allocation for import authorisation is restricted to members of the 
Fiduciary Office of Swiss Holders of Compulsory Cereal Stocks (OSSOC). To import 
coarse grain for human consumption (HS 10), authorisation is through Reserve Suisse, 
and this is restricted to only special mills that process imported grains. In addition, 
there are also quotas with specific provisions regarding origin of products; examples 
of such TRQs are meat
17 (HS 2) and milk
18 (HS 4).  
Table 2 presents detailed information on the importance of TRQs notified by 
Switzerland to the WTO. In addition, the table gives shares of developing countries in 
total imports as well as in imports under the TRQ regime. The main data sources for 
the calculations are total agricultural imports from all countries (developed, 
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Table 2  Overview of Agricultural Imports, 2001-2006 
  Total 
agricultural 
imports 


















  in million CHF  in percentage terms 
2001  8,849.21  5,757.41  2,474.41  27.96  7.97  1.24 
2002  8,978.37  5,707.71  1,753.77  19.53  6.58  1.29 
2003  9,181.80  5,955.25  1,872.51  20.39  7.31  1.49 
2004  9,246.35  5,919.49  1,668.88  18.05  6.90  1.25 
2005  9,601.92  5,911.73  1,534.98  15.99  11.16  1.78 
2006  10,358.87  6,328.28  1,707.21  16.48  11.19  1.84 
Source: Own calculations from Swiss Aussenhandelsstatistik, 2001-2006 
 
In 2006, out of a total of 10,359 million CHF in agricultural imports, 6328 million 
CHF, or nearly 61 percent of imports were covered by product groups notified under 
the TRQ regime. This substantiates the importance of TRQ imports in total 
agricultural imports by Switzerland. Table 2 shows that the total value of agricultural 
imports in 2001 was over 8,800 million CHF; this increased to 10,359 million in 2006 
– an increase of 14.57 percent over the course of the period 2001-2006. Trade data for 
this period show that on the one hand, total imports of product groups notified under 
TRQs increased by 9 percent (from 5,757 million CHF to 6,328 million CHF), while 
on the other hand, total TRQ imports declined from 2,474 million CHF to 1,707 
million CHF. In percentage terms, this represents a decline of 45 percent in total TRQ 
imports over the period 2001-2006. An explanation for falling imports under the TRQ 
regime is that most of the products that were earlier imported under TRQs now come 
under bilateral
19 and free trade agreements (FTAs),
20 given that these agreements 
allow preferential tariffs to the partner countries. As a result of a bilateral agreement 
with the European Union, imports of agricultural products from the EU have increased 
manyfold. Similarly, agricultural imports from developing countries like China, Chile, 
Israel, Mexico, Morocco and Turkey, with which Switzerland has concluded FTAs, 
have also registered an increase.
21 
Table 3 presents detailed information on trade flows for all the product groups 
notified by Switzerland under the TRQ regime from 2001 through 2006. It lists the 
share of TRQ imports in total agricultural imports and developing countries’ share in 
total TRQ imports. Volume 9 Number 2 2008/p. 8-31  esteyjournal.com 
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Table 3  Overview of Agricultural Imports under TRQs, 2001-2006 
   2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 






























HS 1: live 
animals 
60.38  0.23  7.79  0 10.98 0 11.87 0 11.79 0 13.41 0 
HS 2: meat & 
edible meat 
offal 
73.95 22.13 44.26 22.45 79.16 18.08 63.93 16.75 64.41 29.08  63.2  33.65 
HS 4: dairy & 
dairy products 
94.44 0.06 47.37 0.05 82.25 0.31 92.25 0.15 92.98 0.04 91.12 0.06 
HS 5: bovine 
semen 
9.91 0  0  0 7.91 0 6.01 0 7.85  0.2  6.87  0.8 
HS 6: live 
plants & cut 
flowers  
14.8  18.92 14.15 15.84 13.61 17.29 13.49 20.33 13.43 27.07 13.57 26.48 
HS 7: 
vegetables 
77.12 4.44 47.55 3.28 72.53 4.64 67.77 5.88 68.49 5.28 71.45 5.44 
HS 8: fresh 
fruits 
7.37 17.72 8.58  8.16 11.14 8.09 11.38  6.4  10.15  10.41 9.81  5.99 
HS  10:  grains 45.44 5.33 39.51 3.47 38.19 3.13 33.44 1.94 30.31 3.81 16.41 3.84 
HS 11: products 
of milling 
industry; malt 







32.75 15.4 19.21 1.79  32.7  6.42 31.97 3.33 31.97 3.36 29.42  4.9 
HS 20: seed 
fruit products  
2.46 0 0.21 0 2.66  0.02  2.85 0 2.23  0.04  1.92  0.15 
HS 22: 
beverages, 
spirits & vinegar 
56.84 4.83 52.27 3.95 15.72 2.41  9.35  2.31  8.62  2.84  6.91  2.83 
HS  35:  casein  3.67  1.34  0.68 0 4.02 0 3.62 0  4.8  1.52  5.02  1.27 
Average    42.98 7.97 30.73 6.58 31.44 7.31 28.19  6.9  27.93  10.26  26.98  11.19 
* TRQ imports as a percentage of total agricultural imports 
** Developing countries’ percentage share in total agricultural imports under TRQs 
Source: Own calculations based on MA: 2 commitments and Swiss Aussenhandelsstatistik for 2001-2006 Volume 9 Number 2 2008/p. 8-31  esteyjournal.com 
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The analysis of products imported under the TRQ regime suggests that on average 
nearly 85 percent of total dairy and dairy products (HS 4) were imported under TRQs. 
Close to 71 percent of total imports of vegetables (HS 7) were under TRQs. Meat and 
meat offal (HS 2) followed with over 65 percent. For meat preparations (HS 16), 30 
percent were imported under TRQs, whereas only 14 percent of the total cut flowers 
and live plants (HS 6) were imported under the TRQ regime. For other groups, TRQs 
were less important. Table 3 shows that the average share of developing countries in 
total agricultural imports under TRQs was 11 percent in 2006. Notable exceptions 
were meat (HS 2) and flowers (HS 6) – product groups in which developing countries’ 
shares ranged from 26 to 34 percent. Developing countries’ shares of imports of fresh 
vegetables (HS 7) and fruits (HS 8) were between 5 and 6 percent. For grains (HS 10); 
meat and fish products (HS 16); and spirits, beverages and vinegar (HS 22) their 
shares were low, at less than 5 percent in 2006. Trade flow analysis suggests that more 
than 75 percent of the total TRQ imports came from EU member states. Developing 
countries had a relatively small share in total agricultural imports, and participation by 
LDCs was marginal. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Kenya, Mexico, 
Morocco, South Africa and Thailand were the main developing countries that 
participated in imports under the TRQ regime during the period 2001-2006; these 
countries had a share of over 90 percent of imports from developing countries in all 
the product groups imported under the notified TRQs. It is interesting to note that 
participation in Swiss agricultural imports by the “less developed” developing 
countries is, however, very limited.  
The fact that only a few developing countries participate in TRQ imports suggests 
that all developing countries do not benefit from the additional market access allowed 
through lower in-quota tariffs under the TRQ regime. The reason for low participation 
by most developing countries is that agricultural products from most of these 
countries are unable to utilize the lower in-quota tariffs under the TRQ regime to gain 
access into the Swiss market. The explanation for lower participation in TRQ trade is 
not the lack of developing countries’
 export potential
22 but the existing tariff and non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) that impede market access for developing countries’ agricultural 
products. One main tariff impediment is high in- and out-of-quota tariffs. Another is 
the preferential tariffs allowed under bilateral agreements and FTAs that are lower 
than in-quota tariffs allowed on products imported under the TRQ regime. As a result, 
countries prefer to trade under the preferential trade framework of the bilateral and 
free trade agreements. Finally Switzerland has specific tariffs that place the producers 
of low-value agricultural products at a disadvantage and impede participation by 
developing countries. Important NTBs that impede participation in the import market S. Khorana 
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in Switzerland and thus are relevant from a developmental perspective are supply side 
constraints; institutional weaknesses such as lack of export finance and insurance 
facilities; inability to meet the rules-of-origin requirements for imports; infrastructural 
bottlenecks and high transportation costs in developing countries; strict labeling 
requirements; stringent health and safety standards; and consumers’ perceptions about 
the origin of products. These barriers result in additional compliance costs for 
developing-country exporters. Consequently some developing countries that have the 
potential to export are excluded from participation in the import market in 
Switzerland. 
Impact of the Existing TRQ Administrative Mechanism 
on Trade Flows and Market Access for Developing 
Countries’ Exporters 
he objectives of TRQ administration are threefold. First, from an international 
perspective the method of TRQ administration employed should allow maximum 
market access opportunities up to the full amount of the TRQ level. Second, from the 
perspective of the home country, administration should allow for the most efficient 
use of domestic resources and ensure that the lowest-cost firms import. Third, 
administration of TRQs should be efficient and transparent so that resources are not 
lost to rent seeking because of high transaction and administration costs for the 
importers. Some main characteristics of TRQs and TRQ management that determine 
market access for developing countries’ agricultural products in Switzerland are in- 
and out-of-quota tariff rates, transaction costs associated with the different 
administrative methods, validity and size of quota allocations, size of existing market 
access commitments and country-specific quotas. Other factors, such as low in-quota 
preference margins on agricultural products and the specific structures of tariffs, place 
developing-country exporters at a distinct disadvantage in comparison to EU member 
states and result in their lower participation as sources of Swiss imports. 
An analysis of the Zolltarif
23 shows that low out-of-quota tariffs are notified on 
products such as bovine semen (HS 5) and fodder (HS 10) that are required to boost 
the competitiveness of pharmaceutical and food processing firms, which otherwise 
would be hampered by costly inputs. This suggests that Switzerland employs TRQs to 
protect its domestic producers. In addition, preferential tariffs allowed under the 
bilateral agreements also influence partner countries’ trade flows. Trade data show that 
agricultural imports from the EU have registered a steady increase, while those from 
developing countries have declined under the TRQ regime. An examination of the 
Swiss tariff schedule shows that tariffs under the bilateral agreement are identical to 
and at times even lower than preferential tariffs notified on imports from developing 
countries under the Generalised System of Preferences
24 (GSP) scheme, placing 
T S. Khorana 
 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy    19
developing countries at a distinct tariff disadvantage. For instance, the in-quota tariff 
on orchids (HS 6) is zero under the Swiss-EU bilateral agreement, compared to CHF 
20/100 kg under the GSP framework.
25 As a result, there is indirect importation of cut 
flowers via the EU, though this fact cannot be substantiated due to lack of re-export 
figures. In this manner, TRQs influence trade flows of the partner countries.  
The method of administration is another determinant of the total extent of access 
allowed to the Swiss market. For instance, the TRQ on beef (HS 2) is allocated with 
the HI method, which provides certainty to importers about future participation. As a 
result, Swiss meat importers have invested in upgrading the infrastructure and 
technical capacity of meat producers in Brazil and Argentina; this investment has 
helped these countries’ producers to remain competitive. In this manner, the HI 
method has the potential to impact trade flows. Another method used is the DPR, 
which requires importers to commit to domestic purchases as a precondition for the 
allocation of import quotas. Consequently, importers in Switzerland import frozen 
poultry from developing countries (mainly China and Thailand) to offset their cost 
disadvantage under the DPR method. This method, therefore, also influences trade 
flows. Further, from an efficiency perspective this method is not welfare enhancing for 
either consumers or producers, as it indirectly subsidizes the high cost of domestic 
production and violates the fundamental principles of competition policy. Similarly, 
the LD method influences trade flows because the allocation of import shares is 
uncertain and makes long-term planning difficult for importers. The FCFS method 
also favours nearby exporting countries, mainly the EU, especially for products with 
shorter TRQ validity. The use of this method results in losses and disrupts shipments 
from distant developing countries because importers face uncertainty when purchasing 
imports, especially if the quota limit is being approached. Auctioning is deemed a 
generally efficient method by which to allocate the right to import (Bergsten et. al, 
1987; Skully, 1999), but such may not always be the case. TRQ auctions in 
Switzerland are based on the principle of “maximum bid, maximum share”, which 
does not specify the maximum share per bidder. This implies that it is possible for one 
group to purchase the entire portion of the right to import and withhold part of the 
licensed import quantity to maximise rents. In this manner, the design of the bidding 
system in Switzerland affects total imports as well as participation by countries 
(Khorana, 2004). The question thus arises as to whether TRQs achieve the objective of 
allowing maximum market access opportunities up to the full quota level in 
Switzerland. 
Management-specific factors, i.e., limited validity periods,
26 small size and the 
manner of import quota allocation, discriminate against distant suppliers and do not 
allow for economies of size and coordination; these factors thus affect the trade flows 
of countries that supply imports under the TRQ regime. Limited validity and the use S. Khorana 
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of different TRQ administration methods complicate management, contribute to lack 
of transparency in administration and result in high transaction costs. An example of a 
high transaction cost under the TRQ regime in Switzerland is the cost to speed up 
information on the total quantity of imports within in-quota tariffs under the FCFS 
method. Another form of transaction cost is the additional cost importers incur to 
purchase a certain percentage of domestic produce under the DPR method, as, for 
instance, in the case of cut flowers (HS 6) or poultry meat (HS 2). Similarly, under the 
LD method, importers bear the costs to hedge against the insecurity of not getting 
quota access for the firm’s profit-maximising quantity in the case of, for example, 
vegetables (HS 7). Figure 1 illustrates the impact of transaction costs on the net import 
demand. These costs often result in a low TRQ fill rate as, for instance, in the case of 
cut flowers, so that imports are below the minimum access commitments. 
 
 
Qo: quantity that would have been imported if there were no protection  
Q1: quantity that would be imported at the in-quota tariff under the TRQ regime without transaction costs 
Q2: quantity that should be imported at the world price plus in-quota tariff rate plus transaction costs 
PT: out-of-quota tariff rate 
Pd: domestic price of the imported product 
Pw: world market price 
PMAC: market price at in-quota tariff (world market price and in-quota tariff) 
D1: import demand without transaction costs 
D2: import demand with transaction costs 
TC: transaction costs 
Figure 1  Impact of transaction costs on TRQ fill rate. 
 
The figure shows that in the absence of transaction costs, total imports would be 
Q1 at price PMAC. If the administrative mechanism results in transaction costs, then the 
domestic price of imported goods (Pd) will be the world price plus the in-quota tariff 
(PMAC) and transaction costs (TC). In effect, net import demand shifts down from D1 
to D2 by the magnitude of transaction costs, and total imports decline from Q1 to Q2. 
For instance, until 2005 imports of cut flowers (HS 6) were managed with a 
combination of LD, HI and DPR methods. While importers were notified of S. Khorana 
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allocations under the HI method at the beginning of the administered period, the 
relevant quantities that importers had to purchase from the domestic market (to be 
eligible for allocation under the DPR method) were not communicated until the 
administered period was underway. In addition, the eligibility to import was notified 
weekly and fluctuated based on the evolution of domestic demand and supply. This 
contributed to uncertainty, increased transaction costs and lowered the fill rate of the 
portion of the TRQ on cut flowers managed by the DPR method.  
While the utilization rates of other administration methods, for instance the FCFS 
(cereals for bread making, HS 10, and dairy products, HS 4) and HI methods (meat, 
HS 2, 16, and fresh vegetables, HS 7), have been over 100 percent, it does necessarily 
follow that the fill rate of an administration method is an indicator of its efficiency. 
Some of the main determinants of fill rates are the applied in-quota tariffs; size of the 
TRQ/import quota; prevailing market conditions;
27 trade preferences and country-
specific quotas allocated by the TRQ administering country;
28 non-tariff barriers such 
as strict standards and labeling requirements and health and safety requirements; and 
transportation costs. In addition, rules on resale of import quota rights in the 
secondary market also affect importers’ incentives to utilize TRQs. The existing rules 
allow resale of quota allocation, which encourages strategic behaviour and rent 
seeking by importers who have been allocated import quotas but do not import during 
the administered period, especially for products with high out-of-quota tariffs. Such 
resale decreases the overall efficiency of TRQs as a market access instrument.  
Another closely related factor that determines the extent of market access for the 
partner countries at the in-quota tariffs are the minimum access commitments. For 
example, the minimum access commitments on pork meat have been maintained at 
1986-88 quantities; as a result, the quota is the binding constraint for imports. The 
definition of the TRQ is yet another determinant of the total market access allowed, as 
in the case of the beef TRQ, which is allocated at a specific 8-digit level with rather 
restrictive product coverage of boneless beef meat. This results in high out-of-quota 
red meat imports from Brazil. Likewise, a broad definition of the TRQ on grains 
allows importers to import high-value organic grains at the in-quota rate of CHF 
29.30/100kg (similar to the rate for non-organic grains), so the current access 
commitment (70,000 tons) is filled with organic grains. This influences market access 
positively for some developed countries, such as Canada, that produce high quality 
organic grains.  
Similarly, country-specific quotas allow additional market access (under both in- 
and out-of-quota tariffs) only to the beneficiary countries. Important examples are 
meat (300 tons of beef to the United States and 170 tons of dried meat to Italy) as well 
as milk and cheese (to France). As a result of country-specific allocations, most 
developing countries that are not the beneficiaries of these allocations are excluded S. Khorana 
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from participating in TRQ imports. In addition, market access for agricultural 
products is influenced by Switzerland’s specific tariff structure. This is because, first, 
a strong Swiss Franc translates specific tariffs into higher ad valorem equivalents 
(AVEs), and, second, levying tariffs by weight discriminates against low-value, 
unprocessed agricultural products, in which low-income developing countries’ 
producers often specialize. This deprives the agricultural products from developing 
countries of their competitive advantage, and specific tariffs become a barrier to 
developing countries’ agricultural exports.  
Existing NTBs are another factor that impedes participation of developing 
countries. Examples of some important NTBs are specific sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
requirements on meat and poultry processing standards, residue limits for pesticides in 
foods and regulation of agricultural biotechnology. Such stringent requirements result 
in high costs of compliance for developing countries. The disadvantage of most low-
income developing countries is compounded by their inability to design production 
structures compatible with the standards required for processed agricultural products. 
There are, in addition, supply constraints as well as infrastructural weaknesses in these 
countries that result in high transportation costs; as well, there are institutional 
drawbacks and technological backwardness, lack of credit availability, high costs of 
financing trade and lack of insurance. All these further limit developing countries’ 
participation in TRQ imports. The inability of most developing countries to benefit 
from preferential market access within in-quota tariffs questions the justification of 
employing TRQs as means to enhance market access. The findings show that, on the 
contrary, this trade policy instrument has the potential to restrict imports of 
agricultural products – a detriment to market access from a developmental 
perspective. 
Conclusions and the Way Forward 
iven that TRQ management in Switzerland has the potential to impact exports of 
the trading partners’ agricultural products, reform is warranted in the existing 
administrative mechanism if TRQs are to be used as a market access instrument from 
the development perspective. The proposed reforms suggest an efficient TRQ 
administrative mechanism, complemented with overall trade liberalization in the long 
term, to enhance the relevance of TRQs from the perspective of developing countries 
and LDCs. 
The first step is to liberalize trade with TRQs in the short term through 
simplification of the existing administrative mechanism. This will enhance 
transparency, reduce the existing high transaction costs, improve TRQ fill rates and 
allow better utilization of import quotas by low-cost suppliers as well as encourage 
new entry. One option to minimize transaction costs is to increase the size of quota 
G S. Khorana 
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allocations. Larger import quotas will allow importers to reap the benefits of 
economies of scale and encourage imports from countries disadvantaged due to high 
transportation costs. In addition, the existing mechanism can be simplified by 
reviewing the rules on tradability of import licences and the resale of import quota 
rights, which at present affect the importers’ incentives to utilize TRQs. To ensure that 
there is no hoarding of import quotas for rent seeking, it is suggested that the resale of 
unused import quota licences be monitored periodically. This is particularly relevant 
in cases when LD and HI are used to manage imports. Under the LD method, there 
can be a strong incentive for importers to overstate their demand for import licences 
and earn rents from resale of quota rights in the secondary market (from those 
importers who are not allocated the licence to import). Similarly, under HI, since new 
importers can only gain entry to the market by participating in imports, new entrants 
have to purchase import rights from the secondary market to be eligible for licence 
allocation in the following year. Rents are another issue that needs to be addressed. 
Regular monitoring of the resale of import quota rights will provide information on 
import needs misrepresentation and will minimize rent seeking. This can be made 
operational by requiring an importer to submit a security deposit in proportion to the 
quota quantity allocated. In the event of lower imports without any valid reason, the 
deposit may be forfeited. Longer validity of import quotas is also proposed, as this 
will allow importers adequate time to plan imports from low-cost suppliers and reap 
the benefits of economies of scale. To make this suggestion operational, authorities 
can consider allocating a certain percentage of yearly import quotas (which can be 80 
percent of last year’s imports) at the beginning of the administered period, with an 
indication of the tentative imports subject to revisions in the final import quantities 
during the administered period. Finally, auctions are proposed as a method by which 
to manage TRQs.
29 The rationale for this suggestion is that auctions reveal 
information on the binding level of import quotas as well as serve as the basis for 
establishing an equivalent tariff. This is substantiated by white wine TRQ auctions in 
Switzerland during 1997-2000 (Jörin & Lengwiler, 2003).
30 It is expected that 
employing auctions will provide a good starting point for gradual liberalization of 
existing protection levels.  
In the long term, trade liberalization with TRQs can be through expansion of the 
existing quotas, reduction of in-quota tariffs, and/or reduction of prevailing high out-
of-quota tariffs. Though member countries in the WTO have been debating expansion 
of TRQs as a means to enhance market access, this may not always necessarily be 
helpful from a development perspective. This is because market access for developing 
countries’ products depends not only on the in- and out-of-quota tariffs but also on the 
prevailing demand and supply conditions as well as their export competitiveness. Any 
expansion of the TRQ has to be necessarily complemented with low out-of-quota S. Khorana 
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tariffs, else rents will continue and the benefits from increased market access will 
accrue to those privileged by administrative methods of access allocation. However, if 
the level of TRQ is the binding constraint, reducing out-of-quota tariffs not only will 
minimize potential rents in the short run but also will increase the probability of out-
of-quota imports in future. Similarly, if in-quota tariffs are the binding constraint, 
reducing out-of-quota tariffs may have no immediate effect, though it will reduce the 
size of future rents. This suggests that any reduction in out-of-quota tariffs, therefore, 
is a potential future gain because lower out-of-quota tariffs will be an opportunity for 
competitive exporters to compete; consumers will also benefit through lower domestic 
prices. In the long term, lower out-of-quota tariffs will reduce rent seeking among 
importers and lead to a more open market. The benefit of additional market access can 
only be reaped by developing countries if capacity-building measures in these 
countries are initiated that aim to support increased participation by exporters in 
international trade. Trade facilitation is imperative if developing countries are to 
benefit from trade liberalization with TRQs.  
The Swiss government acknowledges the importance of capacity building and 
technical assistance for developing countries.
31 As part of its commitment to 
supporting development of developing countries in the multilateral trading system, the 
Swiss government has undertaken various capacity-building measures. Important 
examples of recipients of such initiatives during 2005-06 were Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Morocco and Tajikistan.
32 The measures have improved 
participation and competitiveness of exporters. In addition to government initiatives, 
independent Swiss import organisations, for example the Swiss Import Promotion 
Programme (SIPPO), as well as individual supermarkets that are also importers, for 
example Coop and Migro, have undertaken capacity-building measures in meat (HS 
2), vegetables (HS 7) and fruits (HS 8) that have enhanced market access 
opportunities for the beneficiary countries’ exporters into the Swiss market.  
To conclude, TRQs do not enhance market access for developing countries’ 
agricultural products in Switzerland. The manner of administration is complicated, 
which leads to high transaction costs, which in turn affect the total extent of market 
access allowed to countries participating in Swiss TRQ trade. This pattern negates the 
developmental relevance of TRQs. For developing countries to enjoy the benefit of 
enhanced market access, it is imperative that the management approach be simplified. 
This will enhance transparency and reduce transaction costs, lead to higher fill rates of 
the import quotas by developing countries and consequently impact market access for 
these countries positively. However, simplification of TRQ administration is not the 
only way to enhance market access for trading partners over the long term. Reduction 
of high out-of-quota tariffs is important as well, as this will increase consumer 
welfare, lower quota rents, improve market access for products protected with high S. Khorana 
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out-of-quota tariffs and enhance the developmental relevance of TRQs in the 
multilateral trading system. 
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1.   All imports under the TRQ regime face a two-tiered tariff in a given period. A 
lower in-quota tariff rate is applied to the initial imports. When the quota has 
reached its limit, a higher out-of-quota tariff is applied to the subsequent imports. 
2.   Binswanger & Lutz (1999) show that TRQs administered by the EU on banana 
imports generate rents for the importing firms in the EU, whereas the potential 
benefits to the ACP countries are small. The study found that the total annual cost 
for EU consumers was nearly US$ 2 billion; out of this only US$ 150 million 
reached the exporters in the beneficiary ACP countries. A more recent study by 
Vanzetti et al. (2004) suggests that the total value of resource transfers was € 780 
million, out of which only 20 percent was transferred as rents to the ACP 
producers.  
3.   Fourteen developing countries utilize TRQs to manage their imports of over 180 
agricultural commodities. These countries are Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia and Venezuela. Among these countries, Korea has 
notified the highest number of TRQs (67). 
4.   Since tariffication was based on 1986-88 prices, when world agricultural prices 
were low, countries had considerable discretion over the conversion of non-tariffs 
into tariff equivalents. This allowed countries to continue with high levels of 
protection by “putting water in tariffs”. 
5.   “Dirty quotification” implies the manipulation of the domestic consumption 
calculations by developed countries, given that the reference period for calculating 
consumption levels was not specified in the modalities.  
6.   This agreement is available on line at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/23-lic.pdf S. Khorana 
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7.   For instance, the EU has notified 89 TRQs to the WTO. Of these, 47 are managed 
under a combination of different methods. For instance, a fixed proportion of 
TRQs are issued on a FCFS basis, and once the limit is reached the import quota 
is allocated on the basis of LD; so if there are more requests than there are 
licences available the quota allocations are reduced pro rata where they exceed 
the available quantities. The remaining 42 TRQs are administered with the FCFS 
(20) and HI (22) methods (WTO, 2004b). Studies show that the use of different 
methods in combination increases the complexity of this trade policy instrument 
(Bureau & Tangermann, 2000).  
8.   The G-20 countries have been demanding better administration of TRQs. The G-
20 countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, 
Thailand, Tanzania, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Developed countries, for example 
the United States, have also suggested improving the TRQ administrative 
mechanism as a means to enhance market access in the multilateral trading 
system. 
9.   The main imports were meat and meat offal products (HS 2); fresh vegetables (HS 
7); fish and crustacean mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates (HS 16); and 
beverages and spirits (HS 22). 
10.  Online access: http://www.ezv.admin.ch/themen/00504/index.html?lang=de 
11.  The International Harmonized Commodity Coding and Classification System 
(HS), established by the World Customs Organization, is an international standard 
for world trade at the six-digit level. For example, 10=cereals, 1005=corn, 
1005.90=other corn. Each country has the option of breaking down these 
international HS codes into more digits and more detail to meet its own needs. 
The commodity coverage is based on the definition of agriculture as specified in 
Annex I of the Agreement on Agriculture and includes all items from chapters 1-
24 and chapter 35 of the Harmonized System. 
12.  Details of all the TRQs notified by Switzerland to the WTO are available online 
at http://www.ezv.admin.ch/zollinfo_firmen/abfertigungshilfen/ 
zollkontingente/index.html?lang=de. Accessed on 9/11/2007.  
13.  AVEs are calculated by dividing the specific tariff per unit by the value of the 
product per unit. The detailed modalities for calculating the AVEs are at 
http://www.macmap.org/Reference.Methodology.aspx 
14.  In the past, auctions were used to manage the TRQs notified on wine (1998-2001) 
and grains (2004-2006). 
15.  The modalities and guide to bidding in auctions are available at   
       http://www.blw.admin.ch/imperia/md/content/eauction/benutzerhandbuch_d.pdf 
16.  The Swiss National Bank uses the variable supply method to auction treasury 
bonds twice every month. Jörin & Lengwiler (2003) suggested adopting this 
method for TRQ auctions because they found no instances of collusion among 
bidders when this format was used to auction treasury bonds by the Swiss 
National Bank.  
17.  The meat TRQs limited to specific origin allow imports of dried ham from Spain 
and Italy and sausages from Italy, Spain, Germany and Hungary, as well as pet 
food from the EU. S. Khorana 
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18. The fresh milk TRQ allows import only from France. 
19.  Switzerland has concluded a bilateral agreement with the EU that covers 
agricultural and industrial products. The details of the agreements are at 
http://www.zoll.admin.ch/f/gesetze/dokumente/d30/d30.php 
20.  These are within the framework of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
and cover processed agricultural products and fish and other marine products as 
well as industrial products. Unprocessed agricultural products are not covered by 
the agreement. Available online at  http://www.ezv.admin.ch/index.html?lang=fr 
21.  Switzerland has entered into a FTA with Andorra, Bulgaria, China, Chile, 
Croatia, Faroe Islands, Gaza Strip, India, Israel, Jordan, the Democratic Peoples 
Republic of Korea, Macau, Macedonia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tunisia and Turkey. As a result of the FTA, Switzerland 
allows preferential tariffs on products imported under TRQs and the FTA from 





22.  For this study, the underutilized export potential of the developing countries has 
been calculated on the basis of  
      (a) their share/rank in total world agricultural exports;  
      (b) their share in total agricultural products imported by Switzerland.  
      This has been computed from product maps, an e-portal of the ITC based on 
COMTRADE statistics. The findings suggest the following countries and products 
have an underutilised export potential: Brazil and Thailand in meat and meat 
products (HS 2, 16); Colombia and Thailand in cut flowers (HS 6); Mexico, India 
and China in fresh vegetables (HS 7); Chile, China and Brazil in fruits (HS 8); 
Argentina in grains (HS 10); and Chile in wine (HS 22). 
23.  Online access at www.tares.ch 
24.  The Generalised System of Preferences allows non-reciprocal preferences on 
selected agricultural and industrial products originating in developing countries 
and the LDCs at reduced or zero tariffs over the MFN tariff rates. 
25.  In-quota tariffs for the EU and GSP beneficiaries are available at  
http://xtares.admin.ch/tares/details/ansatzvergleichFormFiller.do;jsessionid=DBhJ
NsGrxVPg3mkf0DN1NYsMsCd81zf8C3lXvLeeerHcJmjxLwiQ!1179872173!-
1118955996?tn=0603.1059&zc=00&schluessel=000. Accessed on 10/11/2007. 
26.  Validity is generally one week, and can be as little as three days during the 
domestic production season. 
27.  Prevalence of either weak demand, especially for goods that are non-storable 
(e.g., eggs, dairy and meat), and/or an inadequate supply can also contribute to an 
underfill during the period of observation. 
28.  For instance, if the TRQ is allocated to a country that is unable to supply the 
entire quantity allocated, the TRQ is underfilled. 
29.  There is an emerging consensus among WTO member countries, supported by 
economic literature, that auctioning import rights is an efficient method of TRQ 
administration (Skully, 2001; Jörin & Lengwiler, 2003). Literature shows that S. Khorana 
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auctioning makes the distribution of quota rents under TRQs more transparent and 
allows the government to retain rents that under the other methods accrue to 
domestic importers (WTO, 2004a). 
30.  Based on the auction results, the TRQ notified on wine (HS 22) was increased 
from 160,000 hl in 1997 to 190,000 hl in 2000; this was later integrated into a 
larger global quota in 2001. 




 Accessed on 30/10/2007. 
32.  These are listed at http://www.seco-ooperation.ch/imperia/md/content/ 
laender/107.pdf?PHPSESSID=cfd8772c3bacbc0c6f0bf7575f8dfd76&langID=1 
and http://www.seco-cooperation.ch/imperia/md/content/laender/ 
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